3 papers
cs.GT2024
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +1
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, an…
cs.GT2023
Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the informat…
cs.GT2023
Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set…