41 citations · 41 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation
Kirill Rudov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Leeat Yariv
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved withi…
Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation
Alessandro Lizzeri, Eran Shmaya, Leeat Yariv
Starting from Robbins (1952), the literature on experimentation via multi-armed bandits has wed exploration and exploitation. Nonetheless, in many applications, agents' exploration…
Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities
Pietro Ortoleva, Evgenii Safonov, Leeat Yariv
Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We cha…
Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We…
Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves
Doruk Cetemen, Can Urgun, Leeat Yariv
We study a model of collective search by teams. Discoveries beget discoveries and correlated search results are governed by a Brownian path. Search results' variation at any point…
Dominance Solvability in Random Games
Noga Alon, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv
We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of…
Equitable voting rules
Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula +2
May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity…