activity
20182026
most citedAn Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching

41 citations · 41 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

econ.TH2026

Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation

Kirill Rudov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Leeat Yariv

Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved withi…

econ.TH2024

Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation

Alessandro Lizzeri, Eran Shmaya, Leeat Yariv

Starting from Robbins (1952), the literature on experimentation via multi-armed bandits has wed exploration and exploitation. Nonetheless, in many applications, agents' exploration…

econ.GN2024★ 41 cited

An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching

Federico Echenique, Alejandro Robinson-Cortés, Leeat Yariv

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitr…

econ.TH2021

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Pietro Ortoleva, Evgenii Safonov, Leeat Yariv

Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We cha…

econ.TH2021

Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv

We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We…

econ.TH2021

Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves

Doruk Cetemen, Can Urgun, Leeat Yariv

We study a model of collective search by teams. Discoveries beget discoveries and correlated search results are governed by a Brownian path. Search results' variation at any point…

econ.TH2021

Dominance Solvability in Random Games

Noga Alon, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv

We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of…

econ.GN2020

Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match

Federico Echenique, Ruy Gonzalez, Alistair Wilson +1

Most doctors in the NRMP are matched to one of their most-preferred internship programs. Since various surveys indicate similarities across doctors' preferences, this suggests a pu…

econ.TH2018

Equitable voting rules

Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula +2

May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity…