4 citations · 5 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Competitive Many-to-One Matching: Sorting vs. Equality
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We study many-to-one matching with transfers and peer effects, such as matching workers to firms, students to schools, residents to neighborhoods, or consumers to status goods. Wit…
On Monotone Persuasion
Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted s…
Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We offer a simple analysis of the problem of choosing a statistical experiment to optimize the induced distribution of posterior medians, or more generally -quantiles for any $q…
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in e…
The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts so as to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate u…
Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approac…
The Persuasion Duality
Piotr Dworczak, Anton Kolotilin
We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the c…
Persuasion Meets Delegation
Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equiv…
Relational Communication
Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-m…