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cs.GT2026
Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
Moshe Babaioff, Rotem Gil, Assaf Romm
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences mi…
cs.GT2019
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan +1
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was…
cs.GT2018
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…