7 citations · 18 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
Moshe Babaioff, Rotem Gil, Assaf Romm
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences mi…
The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence
Péter Biró, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm +2
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a…
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan +1
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was…
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…
An Approximate "Law of One Price" in Random Assignment Games
Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. I…