693 citations · 739 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu +1
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with n…
Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blocks
Vinzenz Thoma, Georgios Piliouras, Luke Marris
Automated design of multi-agent interactions with desirable equilibrium outcomes is inherently difficult due to the computational hardness, non-uniqueness, and instability of the r…
Deviation Ratings: A General, Clone-Invariant Rating Method
Luke Marris, Siqi Liu, Ian Gemp +2
Many real-world multi-agent or multi-task evaluation scenarios can be naturally modelled as normal-form games due to inherent strategic (adversarial, cooperative, and mixed motive)…
Re-evaluating Open-ended Evaluation of Large Language Models
Siqi Liu, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris +3
Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Op…
Convex Markov Games: A New Frontier for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Ian Gemp, Andreas Haupt, Luke Marris +2
Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across tim…
Visualizing 2x2 Normal-Form Games: twoxtwogame LaTeX Package
Luke Marris, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu +2
Normal-form games with two players, each with two strategies, are the most studied class of games. These so-called 2x2 games are used to model a variety of strategic interactions.…
NfgTransformer: Equivariant Representation Learning for Normal-form Games
Siqi Liu, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras +2
Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- a…
Approximating the Core via Iterative Coalition Sampling
Ian Gemp, Marc Lanctot, Luke Marris +11
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away…
Approximating Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games via Stochastic Optimization
Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy s…
Equilibrium-Invariant Embedding, Metric Space, and Fundamental Set of Normal-Form Games
Luke Marris, Ian Gemp, Georgios Piliouras
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from whic…
Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers
Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp +5
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-game…
Game Theoretic Rating in N-player general-sum games with Equilibria
Luke Marris, Marc Lanctot, Ian Gemp +5
Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Tr…