22 citations · 93 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
On the theory and applications of mechanism design and coalitional games in electricity markets
Orcun Karaca
Although the specific structures of electricity markets are diverse around the world, they were all conceived on the premise of predictable, controllable generation with nonnegligi…
No-Regret Learning from Partially Observed Data in Repeated Auctions
Orcun Karaca, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Anna Leidi +1
We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adap…
Core-Selecting Mechanisms in Electricity Markets
Orcun Karaca, Maryam Kamgarpour
Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of partic…
Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proof Mechanisms
Orcun Karaca, Maryam Kamgarpour
Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations…
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
Orcun Karaca, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Neil Walton +1
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the pa…