3 citations · 9 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Empirical strategy-proofness
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduce…
Empirical bias of extreme-price auctions: analysis
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a com…
The paradox of monotone structural QRE
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)'s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.
Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence
Alexander L. Brown, Rodrigo A. Velez
We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The analysis of these auctions b…
Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget
Rodrigo A. Velez
We study the incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among financially constrained roommates. Each agent reports her values fo…