activity
20182021
most citedEmpirical strategy-proofness

3 citations · 9 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

econ.TH2021★ 1 cited

Balanced House Allocation

Xinghua Long, Rodrigo A. Velez

We introduce balancedness a fairness axiom in house allocation problems. It requires a mechanism to assign the top choice, the second top choice, and so on, on the same number of p…

cs.GT2020

A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget

Rodrigo A. Velez

The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents' well documen…

econ.TH2019★ 3 cited

Empirical strategy-proofness

Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown

We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduce…

econ.TH2019★ 2 cited

Empirical bias of extreme-price auctions: analysis

Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown

We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a com…

econ.TH2019

The paradox of monotone structural QRE

Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown

McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)'s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.

econ.GN2019★ 1 cited

Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence

Alexander L. Brown, Rodrigo A. Velez

We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The analysis of these auctions b…