20 citations · 43 across the 26 of their papers we have counts for
27 papers
Projected Exploitability Descent for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried
Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information. Existing approaches for computing Nash equilibrium, the central game-theoretic solution concept, in such…
Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for t…
Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nas…
Consistent Opponent Modeling in Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Na…
Dominated Actions in Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried
Dominance is a fundamental concept in game theory. In normal-form games dominated strategies can be identified in polynomial time. As a consequence, iterative removal of dominated…
Opponent Modeling in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried, Kevin A. Wang, Max Chiswick
In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing a…
Observable Perfect Equilibrium
Sam Ganzfried
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between…
Random Initialization Solves Shapley's Fictitious Play Counterexample
Sam Ganzfried
In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player.…
Fictitious Play with Maximin Initialization
Sam Ganzfried
Fictitious play has recently emerged as the most accurate scalable algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in multiplayer games. We show that the degree of equilibr…
Safe Equilibrium
Sam Ganzfried
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow…
Human strategic decision making in parametrized games
Sam Ganzfried
Many real-world games contain parameters which can affect payoffs, action spaces, and information states. For fixed values of the parameters, the game can be solved using standard…
Computing Nash Equilibria in Multiplayer DAG-Structured Stochastic Games with Persistent Imperfect Information
Sam Ganzfried
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games…
Algorithm for Computing Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Application to Continuous Blotto
Sam Ganzfried
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space…
Prediction of Bayesian Intervals for Tropical Storms
Max Chiswick, Sam Ganzfried
Building on recent research for prediction of hurricane trajectories using recurrent neural networks (RNNs), we have developed improved methods and generalized the approach to pred…
Fast Complete Algorithm for Multiplayer Nash Equilibrium
Sam Ganzfried
We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demon…
Empirical Analysis of Fictitious Play for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Games
Sam Ganzfried
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and…
Mistakes in Games
Sam Ganzfried
We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, st…
Parallel Algorithm for Approximating Nash Equilibrium in Multiplayer Stochastic Games with Application to Naval Strategic Planning
Sam Ganzfried, Conner Laughlin, Charles Morefield
Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as…
Most Important Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy
Sam Ganzfried, Max Chiswick
Poker is a large complex game of imperfect information, which has been singled out as a major AI challenge problem. Recently there has been a series of breakthroughs culminating in…
Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game
Sam Ganzfried, Austin Nowak, Joannier Pinales
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nas…
Optimization-Based Algorithm for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies against Pure Mutations
Sam Ganzfried
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if…
Predicting Hurricane Trajectories using a Recurrent Neural Network
Sheila Alemany, Jonathan Beltran, Adrian Perez +1
Hurricanes are cyclones circulating about a defined center whose closed wind speeds exceed 75 mph originating over tropical and subtropical waters. At landfall, hurricanes can resu…
Optimal Weighting for Exam Composition
Sam Ganzfried, Farzana Yusuf
A problem faced by many instructors is that of designing exams that accurately assess the abilities of the students. Typically these exams are prepared several days in advance, and…
Computing Human-Understandable Strategies
Sam Ganzfried, Farzana Yusuf
Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest…