78 citations · 145 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations
Markus Brill, Théo Delemazure, Anne-Marie George +2
Liquid democracy is a novel paradigm for collective decision-making that gives agents the choice between casting a direct vote or delegating their vote to another agent. We conside…
Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting
Markus Brill, Jonas Israel, Evi Micha +1
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existi…
Dynamic Proportional Rankings
Jonas Israel, Markus Brill
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented.…
Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)
Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games,…
Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information
Aviram Imber, Jonas Israel, Markus Brill +1
We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter p…
Selecting Matchings via Multiwinner Voting: How Structure Defeats a Large Candidate Space
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an a…
Phragmén's Voting Methods and Justified Representation
Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Svante Janson +1
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragmén proposed a load-balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three commit…