22 citations · 26 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Dynamic Proportional Rankings
Jonas Israel, Markus Brill
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented.…
Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)
Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games,…
Selecting Matchings via Multiwinner Voting: How Structure Defeats a Large Candidate Space
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an a…
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig +1
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We prov…