8 citations · 26 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Computing Equilibrium Nominations in Presidential Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nom…
Safe Opponent Exploitation For Epsilon Equilibrium Strategies
Linus Jeary, Paolo Turrini
In safe opponent exploitation players hope to exploit their opponents' potentially sub-optimal strategies while guaranteeing at least the value of the game in expectation for thems…
Peer Selection with Noisy Assessments
Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei, Paolo Turrini +1
In the peer selection problem a group of agents must select a subset of themselves as winners for, e.g., peer-reviewed grants or prizes. Here, we take a Condorcet view of this aggr…
PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection
Nicholas Mattei, Paolo Turrini, Stanislav Zhydkov
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an indi…
Reducing selfish routing inefficiencies using traffic lights
Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
Traffic congestion games abstract away from the costs of junctions in transport networks, yet, in urban environments, these often impact journey times significantly. In this paper…
Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting
Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their…
Endogenous games with goals: side-payments among goal-directed artificial agents
Paolo Turrini
Artificial agents are typically oriented to the realization of an externally assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution such time lapse or power con…
Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers
Valentin Goranko, Paolo Turrini
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other pl…
Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations
Valentin Goranko, Paolo Turrini
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utili…