8 citations · 26 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
22 papers
Computing Equilibrium Nominations in Presidential Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nom…
Modelling and Predicting Online Vaccination Views using Bow-tie Decomposition
Yueting Han, Marya Bazzi, Paolo Turrini
Social media has become increasingly important in shaping public vaccination views, especially since the COVID-19 outbreak. This paper uses bow-tie structure to analyse a temporal…
Enabling the Digital Democratic Revival: A Research Program for Digital Democracy
Davide Grossi, Ulrike Hahn, Michael Mäs +26
This white paper outlines a long-term scientific vision for the development of digital-democracy technology. We contend that if digital democracy is to meet the ambition of enablin…
Safe Opponent Exploitation For Epsilon Equilibrium Strategies
Linus Jeary, Paolo Turrini
In safe opponent exploitation players hope to exploit their opponents' potentially sub-optimal strategies while guaranteeing at least the value of the game in expectation for thems…
Quantifying Consistency and Information Loss for Causal Abstraction Learning
Fabio Massimo Zennaro, Paolo Turrini, Theodoros Damoulas
Structural causal models provide a formalism to express causal relations between variables of interest. Models and variables can represent a system at different levels of abstracti…
Towards Computing an Optimal Abstraction for Structural Causal Models
Fabio Massimo Zennaro, Paolo Turrini, Theodoros Damoulas
Working with causal models at different levels of abstraction is an important feature of science. Existing work has already considered the problem of expressing formally the relati…
On the Complexity of Majority Illusion in Social Networks
Umberto Grandi, Grzegorz Lisowski, M. S. Ramanujan +1
Majority illusion occurs in a social network when the majority of the network nodes belong to a certain type but each node's neighbours mostly belong to a different type, therefore…
Enabling Imitation-Based Cooperation in Dynamic Social Networks
Jacques Bara, Paolo Turrini, Giulia Andrighetto
The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated…
Predicting Voting Outcomes in the Presence of Communities, Echo Chambers and Multiple Parties
Jacques Bara, Omer Lev, Paolo Turrini
A recently proposed graph-theoretic metric, the influence gap, has shown to be a reliable predictor of the effect of social influence in two-party elections, albeit only tested on…
Peer Selection with Noisy Assessments
Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei, Paolo Turrini +1
In the peer selection problem a group of agents must select a subset of themselves as winners for, e.g., peer-reviewed grants or prizes. Here, we take a Condorcet view of this aggr…
Bounding the Inefficiency of Route Control in Intelligent Transport Systems
Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route co…
PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection
Nicholas Mattei, Paolo Turrini, Stanislav Zhydkov
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an indi…
Reducing selfish routing inefficiencies using traffic lights
Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
Traffic congestion games abstract away from the costs of junctions in transport networks, yet, in urban environments, these often impact journey times significantly. In this paper…
Convergence of Opinion Diffusion is PSPACE-complete
Dmitry Chistikov, Grzegorz Lisowski, Mike Paterson +1
We analyse opinion diffusion in social networks, where a finite set of individuals is connected in a directed graph and each simultaneously changes their opinion to that of the maj…
Similarity Measures based on Local Game Trees
Sabrina Evans, Paolo Turrini
We study strategic similarity of game positions in two-player extensive games of perfect information, by looking at the structure of their local game trees, with the aim of improvi…
How does information affect asymmetric congestion games?
Charlotte Roman, Paolo Turrini
We study traffic networks with multiple origin-destination pairs, relaxing the simplifying assumption of agents having complete knowledge of the network structure. We identify a ub…
A network-based rating system and its resistance to bribery
Umberto Grandi, Paolo Turrini
We study a rating system in which a set of individuals (e.g., the customers of a restaurant) evaluate a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their aggregated opinion determini…
Computing rational decisions in extensive games with limited foresight
Paolo Turrini
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they…
Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting
Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their…
Endogenous games with goals: side-payments among goal-directed artificial agents
Paolo Turrini
Artificial agents are typically oriented to the realization of an externally assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution such time lapse or power con…
Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers
Valentin Goranko, Paolo Turrini
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other pl…
Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations
Valentin Goranko, Paolo Turrini
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utili…