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20202026
most citedLiquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions

6 citations · 15 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

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15 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Learning vs. Optimizing Players in Budgeted Games

Giannis Fikioris, Balasubramanian Sivan, Éva Tardos

We study repeated general games over rounds between a utility-maximizing optimizer and a learning agent, where budget constraints couple the players' decisions across rounds. W…

cs.GT2026

Resource Allocation and Conversion along the Org Chart

Yuan Deng, Giannis Fikioris, Chido Onyeze +3

We consider the allocation of multiple heterogeneous resources to agents who are organized according to an organizational hierarchy. In a company those correspond to business units…

cs.GT2026

Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Balasubramanian Sivan, Éva Tardos

The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing…

cs.GT2026

Robust Temporal Guarantees in Budgeted Sequential Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Robert Kleinberg, Yoav Kolumbus +2

In modern advertising platforms, learning algorithms are deployed by budget-constrained bidders to maximize their accumulated value. These algorithms often offer classical utility…

cs.GT2025

Robust Resource Allocation via Competitive Subsidies

David X. Lin, Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee +1

A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive ut…

cs.GT2025

Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies

David X. Lin, Daniel Hall, Giannis Fikioris +2

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has…

cs.GT2025

Robust Equilibria in Shared Resource Allocation via Strengthening Border's Theorem

David X. Lin, Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris +1

We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that e…

cs.GT2025

Allocating Public Goods via Dynamic Max-Min Fairness: Long-Run Behavior and Competitive Equilibria

Chido Onyeze, Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris +1

Dynamic max-min fair allocation (DMMF) is a simple and popular mechanism for the repeated allocation of a shared resource among competing agents: in each round, each agent can choo…

cs.GT2024

Learning in Budgeted Auctions with Spacing Objectives

Giannis Fikioris, Robert Kleinberg, Yoav Kolumbus +3

In many repeated auction settings, participants care not only about how frequently they win but also how their winnings are distributed over time. This problem arises in various pr…

cs.GT2024

No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints

Gagan Aggarwal, Giannis Fikioris, Mingfei Zhao

Advertisers increasingly use automated bidding to optimize their ad campaigns on online advertising platforms. Autobidding optimizes an advertiser's objective subject to various co…

cs.GT2023

Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee, Éva Tardos

We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the r…

cs.GT2023★ 4 cited

Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources

Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limite…

cs.GT2022★ 6 cited

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos

We study the liquid welfare in sequential first-price auctions with budget-limited buyers. We focus on first-price auctions, which are increasingly commonly used in many settings,…

cs.GT2021

Incentives in Dominant Resource Fair Allocation under Dynamic Demands

Giannis Fikioris, Rachit Agarwal, Éva Tardos

Every computer system -- from schedulers in clouds (e.g. Amazon) to computer networks to operating systems -- performs resource allocation across system users. The defacto allocati…

cs.GT2020★ 2 cited

Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis

Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stabil…