activity
20202026
most citedLiquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions

6 citations · 15 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

19 papers

cs.GT2026

Resource Allocation and Conversion along the Org Chart

Yuan Deng, Giannis Fikioris, Chido Onyeze +3

We consider the allocation of multiple heterogeneous resources to agents who are organized according to an organizational hierarchy. In a company those correspond to business units…

cs.GT2026

Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Balasubramanian Sivan, Éva Tardos

The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing…

cs.GT2026

Robust Temporal Guarantees in Budgeted Sequential Auctions

Giannis Fikioris, Robert Kleinberg, Yoav Kolumbus +2

In modern advertising platforms, learning algorithms are deployed by budget-constrained bidders to maximize their accumulated value. These algorithms often offer classical utility…

cs.GT2025

Robust Resource Allocation via Competitive Subsidies

David X. Lin, Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee +1

A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive ut…

cs.GT2025

Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies

David X. Lin, Daniel Hall, Giannis Fikioris +2

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has…

cs.GT2025

Robust Equilibria in Shared Resource Allocation via Strengthening Border's Theorem

David X. Lin, Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris +1

We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that e…