2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Complexity of Auctions with Interdependence
Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Minrui Xu
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the age…
A Direct Proof of the Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets
Simon Mauras, Pawel Pralat, Adrian Vetta
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a bala…
Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis +1
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided…
Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information
Hugo Gimbert, Claire Mathieu, Simon Mauras
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algo…
Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures
Simon Mauras
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since i…