activity
20182026
most citedTwo-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures

2 citations · 6 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.LG2026

Adaptive Bandit Algorithms for Contextual Matching Markets

Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Vianney Perchet +1

We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new…

cs.GT2026

Complexity of Auctions with Interdependence

Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Minrui Xu

We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the age…

cs.GT2025

A Direct Proof of the Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets

Simon Mauras, Pawel Pralat, Adrian Vetta

We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a bala…

cs.GT2024

Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning

Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis +1

We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided…

cs.GT2021

Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information

Hugo Gimbert, Claire Mathieu, Simon Mauras

School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algo…

cs.GT2020★ 2 cited

Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures

Simon Mauras

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since i…

cs.DS2019★ 2 cited

Two-Sided Matching Markets with Correlated Random Preferences

Hugo Gimbert, Claire Mathieu, Simon Mauras

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its intro…

cs.DS2018★ 2 cited

How to aggregate Top-lists: Approximation algorithms via scores and average ranks

Claire Mathieu, Simon Mauras

A top-list is a possibly incomplete ranking of elements: only a subset of the elements are ranked, with all unranked elements tied for last. Top-list aggregation, a generalization…