14 citations · 66 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers · 1 filter
Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees
Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak, Lirong Xia +1
Recent work in fair division has focused on either simultaneously satisfying closely related fairness notions or achieving a single notion across the ex-ante and ex-post worlds. We…
Distribution of Chores with Information Asymmetry
Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Tomasz Wąs +1
A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a sing…
Epistemic vs. Counterfactual Fairness in Allocation of Resources
Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Sujoy Sikdar +2
Resource allocation is fundamental to a variety of societal decision-making settings, ranging from the distribution of charitable donations to assigning limited public housing amon…
Anti-Malware Sandbox Games
Sujoy Sikdar, Sikai Ruan, Qishen Han +4
We develop a game theoretic model of malware protection using the state-of-the-art sandbox method, to characterize and compute optimal defense strategies for anti-malware. We model…
Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare
Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profil…
Sequential Mechanisms for Multi-type Resource Allocation
Sujoy Sikdar, Xiaoxi Guo, Haibin Wang +2
Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a cen…
Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whethe…
Representative Proxy Voting
Elliot Anshelevich, Zack Fitzsimmons, Rohit Vaish +1
We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the cl…
How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?
Lirong Xia
Understanding the likelihood for an election to be tied is a classical topic in many disciplines including social choice, game theory, political science, and public choice. Despite…
The Smoothed Complexity of Computing Kemeny and Slater Rankings
Lirong Xia, Weiqiang Zheng
The computational complexity of winner determination under common voting rules is a classical and fundamental topic in the field of computational social choice. Previous work has e…
The Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice
Lirong Xia
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern…
Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource Allocation
Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Haibin Wang +3
In multi-type resource allocation (MTRA) problems, there are p 2 types of items, and n agents, who each demand one unit of items of each type, and have strict linear preferen…
Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Chores
Rupert Freeman, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) eq…
A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy
Malik Magdon-Ismail, Lirong Xia
Direct democracy is a special case of an ensemble of classifiers, where every person (classifier) votes on every issue. This fails when the average voter competence (classifier acc…
Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets
Sibel Adali, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without mo…