activity
20162026
most citedThe Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice

14 citations · 66 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

22 papers

cs.GT2026

Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees

Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak, Lirong Xia +1

Recent work in fair division has focused on either simultaneously satisfying closely related fairness notions or achieving a single notion across the ex-ante and ex-post worlds. We…

cs.GT2023

Distribution of Chores with Information Asymmetry

Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Tomasz Wąs +1

A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a sing…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Epistemic vs. Counterfactual Fairness in Allocation of Resources

Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Sujoy Sikdar +2

Resource allocation is fundamental to a variety of societal decision-making settings, ranging from the distribution of charitable donations to assigning limited public housing amon…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Anti-Malware Sandbox Games

Sujoy Sikdar, Sikai Ruan, Qishen Han +4

We develop a game theoretic model of malware protection using the state-of-the-art sandbox method, to characterize and compute optimal defense strategies for anti-malware. We model…

cs.LG2021

Certifiably Robust Interpretation via Renyi Differential Privacy

Ao Liu, Xiaoyu Chen, Sijia Liu +2

Motivated by the recent discovery that the interpretation maps of CNNs could easily be manipulated by adversarial attacks against network interpretability, we study the problem of…

cs.CR2021

Smoothed Differential Privacy

Ao Liu, Yu-Xiang Wang, Lirong Xia

Differential privacy (DP) is a widely-accepted and widely-applied notion of privacy based on worst-case analysis. Often, DP classifies most mechanisms without additive noise as non…

cs.GT2021★ 2 cited

Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare

Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profil…

cs.GT2021

Sequential Mechanisms for Multi-type Resource Allocation

Sujoy Sikdar, Xiaoxi Guo, Haibin Wang +2

Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a cen…

cs.GT2020★ 4 cited

Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1

Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whethe…

cs.GT2020★ 1 cited

Representative Proxy Voting

Elliot Anshelevich, Zack Fitzsimmons, Rohit Vaish +1

We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the cl…

cs.GT2020

How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?

Lirong Xia

Understanding the likelihood for an election to be tied is a classical topic in many disciplines including social choice, game theory, political science, and public choice. Despite…

cs.GT2020★ 3 cited

The Smoothed Complexity of Computing Kemeny and Slater Rankings

Lirong Xia, Weiqiang Zheng

The computational complexity of winner determination under common voting rules is a classical and fundamental topic in the field of computational social choice. Previous work has e…

cs.GT2020★ 14 cited

The Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice

Lirong Xia

We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern…

cs.LG2020

Learning Mixtures of Random Utility Models with Features from Incomplete Preferences

Zhibing Zhao, Ao Liu, Lirong Xia

Random Utility Models (RUMs), which subsume Plackett-Luce model (PL) as a special case, are among the most popular models for preference learning. In this paper, we consider RUMs w…

cs.MA2020★ 1 cited

OPRA: An Open-Source Online Preference Reporting and Aggregation System

Yiwei Chen, Jingwen Qian, Junming Wang +2

We introduce the Online Preference Reporting and Aggregation (OPRA) system, an open-source online system that aims at providing support for group decision-making. We illustrate OPR…

cs.LG2020★ 2 cited

Dual Learning: Theoretical Study and an Algorithmic Extension

Zhibing Zhao, Yingce Xia, Tao Qin +2

Dual learning has been successfully applied in many machine learning applications including machine translation, image-to-image transformation, etc. The high-level idea of dual lea…

cs.GT2020★ 1 cited

Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource Allocation

Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Haibin Wang +3

In multi-type resource allocation (MTRA) problems, there are p 2 types of items, and n agents, who each demand one unit of items of each type, and have strict linear preferen…

cs.GT2020★ 12 cited

Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Chores

Rupert Freeman, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1

We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) eq…

cs.LG2019★ 8 cited

Learning Mixtures of Plackett-Luce Models from Structured Partial Orders

Zhibing Zhao, Lirong Xia

Mixtures of ranking models have been widely used for heterogeneous preferences. However, learning a mixture model is highly nontrivial, especially when the dataset consists of part…

cs.AI2019

Frustratingly Easy Truth Discovery

Reshef Meir, Ofra Amir, Omer Ben-Porat +3

Truth discovery is a general name for a broad range of statistical methods aimed to extract the correct answers to questions, based on multiple answers coming from noisy sources. F…

cs.GT2018★ 6 cited

A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy

Malik Magdon-Ismail, Lirong Xia

Direct democracy is a special case of an ensemble of classifiers, where every person (classifier) votes on every issue. This fails when the average voter competence (classifier acc…

cs.GT2016★ 8 cited

Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets

Sibel Adali, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia

We study multi-type housing markets, where there are types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without mo…