activity
20172024
most citedNash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

109 citations · 168 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing eess.SYShow all

6 papers · 1 filter

eess.SY2020★ 1 cited

Urgency-aware Optimal Routing in Repeated Games through Artificial Currencies

Mauro Salazar, Dario Paccagnan, Andrea Agazzi +2

When people choose routes minimizing their individual delay, the aggregate congestion can be much higher compared to that experienced by a centrally-imposed routing. Yet centralize…

eess.SY2019

The Nash Equilibrium with Inertia in Population Games

Basilio Gentile, Dario Paccagnan, Bolutife Ogunsula +1

In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their uti…

eess.SY2019

When Smoothness is Not Enough: Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization of the Price-of-Anarchy

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game t…

eess.SY2019

Optimal Price of Anarchy in Cost-Sharing Games

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propo…

eess.SY2018★ 4 cited

On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in Aggregative Charging Games

Dario Paccagnan, Francesca Parise, John Lygeros

Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to…

eess.SY2017★ 109 cited

Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

Dario Paccagnan, Basilio Gentile, Francesca Parise +2

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution,…