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20172024
most citedNash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

109 citations · 168 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

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13 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2024

Bridging the Gap Between Central and Local Decision-Making: The Efficacy of Collaborative Equilibria in Altruistic Congestion Games

Bryce L Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S R Pradelski +1

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that al…

cs.GT2023

Collaborative Decision-Making and the k-Strong Price of Anarchy in Common Interest Games

Bryce L. Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1

The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation tec…

cs.GT2023

Collaborative Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems: Quantifying the Strong Price of Anarchy for Resource Allocation Games

Bryce L. Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1

The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborativ…

cs.GT2023

The Cost of Informing Decision-Makers in Multi-Agent Maximum Coverage Problems with Random Resource Values

Bryce L. Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers wit…

cs.GT2021

The Unintended Consequences of Minimizing the Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing eithe…

cs.GT2021

In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation

Dario Paccagnan, Martin Gairing

In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation me…

cs.GT2021

Tractable mechanisms for computing near-optimal utility functions

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

Large scale multiagent systems must rely on distributed decision making, as centralized coordination is either impractical or impossible. Recent works approach this problem under a…

cs.GT2019

Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games

Dario Paccagnan, Rahul Chandan, Bryce L Ferguson +1

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to m…

cs.GT2019

When Smoothness is Not Enough: Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization of the Price of Anarchy

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiency of self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread, characterizing the PoA can be ch…

cs.GT2018

Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation -- Part II: Applications to Submodular, Covering, and Supermodular Problems

Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

A fundamental component of the game theoretic approach to distributed control is the design of local utility functions.Relative to resource allocation problems that are additive ov…

cs.GT2018★ 30 cited

Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation -- Part I: Characterizing and Optimizing the Exact Price of Anarchy

Dario Paccagnan, Rahul Chandan, Jason R. Marden

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions s…

cs.GT2017★ 5 cited

The Importance of System-Level Information in Multiagent Systems Design: Cardinality and Covering Problems

Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

A fundamental challenge in multiagent systems is to design local control algorithms to ensure a desirable collective behaviour. The information available to the agents, gathered ei…

cs.GT2017

Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability

Vinod Ramaswamy, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinct…