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Chuan Yu

21 papers hereh-index 11480 citations30 works total

Matching runs newest-first, so older work may not be attached to this profile yet.

author position
  • middle author21

Across the 21 of 21 papers where every author was matched, so the position is known.

fields
  • cs.GT9
  • cs.LG5
  • cs.AI2
  • cs.IR2
  • cs.MA1
  • eess.SY1
same name
  • Chuan Yu — 18 papers, h 4
  • Chuan Yu — 12 papers, h 9
  • Chuan Yu — 5 papers, h 9
  • Chuan Yu — 5 papers, h 2
  • Chuan Yu — 1 paper, h 3
  • Chuan Yu — 1 paper, h 0

Either other researchers who publish under this name, or the same person where the external sources have not merged their records.

identity via Semantic Scholar / OpenAlex

activity
20182025
most citedA Cooperative-Competitive Multi-Agent Framework for Auto-bidding in Online Advertising

24 citations · 74 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2024Show all

4 papers · 1 filter

cs.LG2024★ 2 cited

AIGB: Generative Auto-bidding via Conditional Diffusion Modeling

Jiayan Guo, Yusen Huo, Zhilin Zhang +5

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bid…

cs.GT2024

MEBS: Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading for Multi-slot Display Advertising

Zhen Gong, Lvyin Niu, Yang Zhao +9

Online bidding and auction are crucial aspects of the online advertising industry. Conventionally, there is only one slot for ad display and most current studies focus on it. Nowad…

cs.LG2024

Trajectory-wise Iterative Reinforcement Learning Framework for Auto-bidding

Haoming Li, Yusen Huo, Shuai Dou +5

In online advertising, advertisers participate in ad auctions to acquire ad opportunities, often by utilizing auto-bidding tools provided by demand-side platforms (DSPs). The curre…

cs.GT2024

Automated Deterministic Auction Design with Objective Decomposition

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia +6

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While t…

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Not affiliated with arXiv. Researcher data from Semantic Scholar (ODC-BY) and OpenAlex.