1 citations · 2 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from…
Bounding the Communication Complexity of Fault-Tolerant Common Coin Tossing
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus. Even though the common coins in the literature are usually \emph{fair} (th…
Strengthening Nash Equilibria
Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as…
Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
We consider -resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, reg…
Resilient Information Aggregation
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the medi…