1 citations · 2 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Sender-Receiver Games with Payment Commitments
Ivan Geffner
We study sender-receiver games in which players commit, before the state is drawn, to payments contingent on the subsequently verified state and the receiver's action. Payments may…
When Competition Helps: Achieving Optimal Traffic Flow with Multiple Autonomous Planners
Ivan Geffner, Erez Karpas, Moshe Tennenholtz
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the soc…
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having a…
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from…
Bounding the Communication Complexity of Fault-Tolerant Common Coin Tossing
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus. Even though the common coins in the literature are usually \emph{fair} (th…
Strengthening Nash Equilibria
Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as…
Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
We consider -resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, reg…
Resilient Information Aggregation
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the medi…
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment po…
Lower Bounds Implementing Mediators in Asynchronous Systems
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern proved that, in asynchronous systems, a -robust equilibrium for players and a trusted mediator can be implemented without the mediat…
Security in Asynchronous Interactive Systems
Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern
Secure function computation has been thoroughly studied and optimized in the past decades. We extend techniques used for secure computation to simulate arbitrary protocols involvin…
Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Talk
Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Ivan Geffner +1
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediat…