8 papers
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…
Secretary, Prophet, and Stochastic Probing via Big-Decisions-First
Aviad Rubinstein, Sahil Singla
We revisit three fundamental problems in algorithms under uncertainty: the Secretary Problem, Prophet Inequality, and Stochastic Probing, each subject to general downward-closed co…
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…
Approximation Schemes for Edit Distance and LCS in Quasi-Strongly Subquadratic Time
Xiao Mao, Aviad Rubinstein
We present novel randomized approximation schemes for the Edit Distance (ED) problem and the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) problem that, for any constant , compute a $(1+Î…
Tight Pair Query Lower Bounds for Matching and Earth Mover's Distance
Amir Azarmehr, Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani +1
How many adjacency matrix queries (also known as pair queries) are required to estimate the size of a maximum matching in an -vertex graph ? We study this fundamental questio…