6 papers · 1 filter
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…
Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents
Alexandros Hollender, Aviad Rubinstein
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the interval, and a set of agents with heterogeneous preferences…
Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein, Zixin Zhou
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the…
The complexity of approximate (coarse) correlated equilibrium for incomplete information games
Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein
We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{ex…