32 citations · 54 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers · 1 filter
Rationality and Behavior Feedback in a Model of Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication
Brendan Gould, Philip Brown
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication is intended to improve road safety through distributed information sharing; however, this type of system faces a design challenge: it is diff…
Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lotto games
Keith Paarporn, Philip N. Brown
Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-…
Valid Utility Games with Information Sharing Constraints
David Grimsman, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-w…
A Coupling Approach to Analyzing Games with Dynamic Environments
Brandon C. Collins, Shouhuai Xu, Philip N. Brown
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situation…
Information Design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication
Brendan T. Gould, Philip N. Brown
The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicular ad hoc networks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each othe…
On Partial Adoption of Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication: When Should Cars Warn Each Other of Hazards?
Brendan T. Gould, Philip N. Brown
The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicular ad hoc networks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each othe…
Providing slowdown information to improve selfish routing
Philip N. Brown
Recent research in the social sciences has identified situations in which small changes in the way that information is provided to consumers can have large aggregate effects on beh…
Avoiding Unintended Consequences: How Incentives Aid Information Provisioning in Bayesian Congestion Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an info…
The Price of Anarchy is Fragile in Single-Selection Coverage Games
Joshua Seaton, Philip Brown
This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are kno…
The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games…
The Cost of Denied Observation in Multiagent Submodular Optimization
David Grimsman, Joshua H. Seaton, Jason R. Marden +1
A popular formalism for multiagent control applies tools from game theory, casting a multiagent decision problem as a cooperation-style game in which individual agents make local c…
Partial Altruism is Worse than Complete Selfishness in Nonatomic Congestion Games
Philip N. Brown
We seek to understand the fundamental mathematics governing infrastructure-scale interactions between humans and machines, particularly when the machines' intended purpose is to in…
Exploiting an Adversary's Intentions in Graphical Coordination Games
Brandon C. Collins, Philip N. Brown
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an ad…
Can Taxes Improve Congestion on All Networks?
Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffi…
Carrots or Sticks? The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing users in congestion games. The pr…
Utilizing Information Optimally to Influence Distributed Network Routing
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studyi…
Security Against Impersonation Attacks in Distributed Systems
Philip N. Brown, Holly Borowski, Jason R. Marden
In a multi-agent system, transitioning from a centralized to a distributed decision-making strategy can introduce vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We study the potential…
Are Multiagent Systems Resilient to Communication Failures?
Philip N. Brown, Holly P. Borowski, Jason R. Marden
A challenge in multiagent control systems is to ensure that they are appropriately resilient to communication failures between the various agents. In many common game-theoretic for…