3 papers
cs.GT2019
Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games
Dario Paccagnan, Rahul Chandan, Bryce L Ferguson +1
How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to m…
cs.GT2019
Carrots or Sticks? The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing users in congestion games. The pr…
cs.GT2019
Utilizing Information Optimally to Influence Distributed Network Routing
Bryce L. Ferguson, Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studyi…