activity
20182023
most citedDU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation

4 citations · 15 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

15 papers

econ.TH2023

Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value

Benjamin Heymann, Alexandre Gilotte, Rémi Chan-Renous

We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding…

cs.AI2023★ 4 cited

DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation

Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Benjamin Heymann, Maxime Vono +2

We consider the dataset valuation problem, that is, the problem of quantifying the incremental gain, to some relevant pre-defined utility of a machine learning task, of aggregating…

cs.IR2022★ 1 cited

Offline Evaluation of Reward-Optimizing Recommender Systems: The Case of Simulation

Imad Aouali, Amine Benhalloum, Martin Bompaire +5

Both in academic and industry-based research, online evaluation methods are seen as the golden standard for interactive applications like recommendation systems. Naturally, the rea…

cs.GT2022

Welfare-Optimized Recommender Systems

Benjamin Heymann, Flavian Vasile, David Rohde

We present a recommender system based on the Random Utility Model. Online shoppers are modeled as rational decision makers with limited information, and the recommendation task is…

cs.GT2021★ 1 cited

A heuristic for estimating Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with correlated values

Benjamin Heymann, Panayotis Mertikopoulos

Our paper concerns the computation of Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. While there exist several equilibrium computation methods for auctions with in…

cs.DM2021★ 3 cited

Causal Inference Theory with Information Dependency Models

Benjamin Heymann, Michel de Lara, Jean-Philippe Chancelier

Inferring the potential consequences of an unobserved event is a fundamental scientific question. To this end, Pearl's celebrated do-calculus provides a set of inference rules to d…

cs.DM2021★ 1 cited

Topological Conditional Separation

Michel de Lara, Jean-Philippe Chancelier, Benjamin Heymann

Pearl's d-separation is a foundational notion to study conditional independence between random variables. We define the topological conditional separation and we show that it is eq…

cs.DM2021★ 2 cited

Conditional Separation as a Binary Relation. A Coq Assisted Proof

Jean-Philippe Chancelier, Michel de Lara, Benjamin Heymann

The concept of d-separation holds a pivotal role in causality theory, serving as a fundamental tool for deriving conditional independence properties from causal graphs. Pearl defin…

math.OC2021

Decomposition-Coordination Method for Finite Horizon Bandit Problems

Michel de Lara, Benjamin Heymann, Jean-Philippe Chancelier

Optimally solving a multi-armed bandit problem suffers the curse of dimensionality. Indeed, resorting to dynamic programming leads to an exponential growth of computing time, as th…

cs.GT2021

Kuhn's Equivalence Theorem for Games in Product Form

Benjamin Heymann, Michel de Lara, Jean-Philippe Chancelier

We propose an alternative to the tree representation of extensive form games. Games in product form represent information with -fields over a product set, and do not require an…

cs.GT2020

Fixed point label attribution for real-time bidding

Martin Bompaire, Antoine Désir, Benjamin Heymann

Problem definition: Most of the display advertising inventory is sold through real-time auctions. The participants of these auctions are typically bidders (Google, Criteo, RTB Hous…

math.OC2020

Kuhn's Equivalence Theorem for Games in Intrinsic Form

Benjamin Heymann, Michel de Lara, Jean-Philippe Chancelier

We state and prove Kuhn's equivalence theorem for a new representation of games, the intrinsic form. First, we introduce games in intrinsic form where information is represented by…

econ.TH2019

Optimal auctions for networked markets with externalities

Benjamin Heymann, Alejandro Jofré

Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard proc…

cs.GT2018

Cost Per Action Constrained Auctions

Benjamin Heymann

A standard result from auction theory is that bidding truthfully in a second price auction is a weakly dominant strategy. The result, however, does not apply in the presence of Cos…

cs.GT2018★ 3 cited

Thresholding at the monopoly price: an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue-maximizing auctions

Thomas Nedelec, Marc Abeille, Clément Calauzènes +3

We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies…