Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value
arXiv:2308.01755
Abstract
We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we discuss the cost for the buyer of limiting himself to shading policies.
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