activity
20222024
most citedCostly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure

4 citations · 9 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing econ.THShow all

6 papers · 1 filter

econ.TH2024

Call the Dentist! A (Con-)Cavity in the Value of Information

Mark Whitmeyer

A natural way of quantifying the ``amount of information'' in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never…

econ.TH2024

Can One Hear the Shape of a Decision Problem?

Mark Whitmeyer

We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of expe…

econ.TH20241 cited

Attraction Via Prices and Information

Pak Hung Au, Mark Whitmeyer

We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an oligopolistic market with search frictions. Although prices are posted and, therefore, guid…

econ.TH2023

A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives

Mark Whitmeyer

A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequ…

econ.TH20234 cited

Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying From Duopolists

Brian C. Albrecht, Mark Whitmeyer

We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers learn about the fit of each competitor's product. In equilibrium, consumers comparison shop: they learn only about…

econ.TH20224 cited

Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure

Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang

A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence g…