12 citations · 43 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets
Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta +1
We consider the problem of maximizing the gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. The seminal impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that even for bilateral t…
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by […
Computing Simple Mechanisms: Lift-and-Round over Marginal Reduced Forms
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao
We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption - a classical problem in Multi-Dimensional Bayesian Mechanism Desig…
Worst-Case Welfare of Item Pricing in the Tollbooth Problem
Zihan Tan, Yifeng Teng, Mingfei Zhao
We study the worst-case welfare of item pricing in the \emph{tollbooth problem}. The problem was first introduced by Guruswami et al, and is a special case of the combinatorial auc…
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization
Yang Cai, Kira Goldner, Steven Ma +1
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller $…
An Efficient -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We consider the black-box reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to virtual welfare maximization. Cai et al. show a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reductio…
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions
Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao
We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to multiple buyers. We consider the case where the seller has costs to produce the i…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu +1
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibil…
Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Duality
Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results…