12 citations · 12 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by […
An Efficient -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We consider the black-box reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to virtual welfare maximization. Cai et al. show a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reductio…
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions
Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao
We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to multiple buyers. We consider the case where the seller has costs to produce the i…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu +1
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibil…