About the Notion of Truth in the Decoherent Histories Approach: a reply to Griffiths

Abstract

Griffiths claims that the ``single family rule'', a basic postulate of the decoherent histories approach, rules out our requirement that any decoherent history has a unique truth value, independently from the decoherent family to which it may belong. Here we analyze the reasons which make our requirement indispensable and we discuss the consequences of rejecting it.

4 pages, Latex, to appear in Phys. Lett. A

References in corpus (3)

• Choice of Consistent Family, and Quantum Incompatibility
• Can the Decoherent Histories Description of Reality be Considered Satisfactory?
• Consistent histories, quantum truth functionals, and hidden variables

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