Objective probability and quantum fuzziness
arXiv:quant-ph/0703035 · doi:10.1007/s10701-008-9266-5
Abstract
This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the "objective preparations view" or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes...
arXiv comment21 pages, no graphics, inspired by "Subjective probability and quantum certainty" (quant-ph/0608190 v2)
References in corpus (9)
- Quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities
- Unknown Quantum States: The Quantum de Finetti Representation
- Conditions for compatibility of quantum state assignments
- The Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics
- How much state assignments can differ
- Facts, Values and Quanta
- The Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics: An overview
- This elusive objective existence
- Do quantum states evolve? Apropos of Marchildon's remarks