Simulatable security for quantum protocols

Abstract

The notion of simulatable security (reactive simulatability, universal composability) is a powerful tool for allowing the modular design of cryptographic protocols (composition of protocols) and showing the security of a given protocol embedded in a larger one. Recently, these methods have received much attention in the quantum cryptographic community. We give a short introduction to simulatable security in general and proceed by sketching the many different definitional choices together with their advantages and disadvantages. Based on the reactive simulatability modelling of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner we then develop a quantum security model. By following the BPW modelling as closely as possible, we show that composable quantum security definitions for quantum protocols can strongly profit from their classical counterparts, since most of the definitional choices in the modelling are independent of the underlying machine model. In particular, we give a proof for the simple composition theorem in our framework.

Added proof of combination lemma; added comparison to the model of Ben-Or, Mayers; minor corrections

References in corpus (1)

• The Universal Composable Security of Quantum Key Distribution

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• Applications of coherent classical communication and the Schur transform to quantum information theory
• Key recycling in authentication
• Limitations on Quantum Key Repeaters
• A Quantum Money Solution to the Blockchain Scalability Problem
• Blind quantum computing with two almost identical states
• Cryptography in a Quantum World
• Smart contracts meet quantum cryptography
• Using Hash-Based Signatures to Bootstrap Quantum Key Distribution
• Composing Quantum Protocols in a Classical Environment
• Two-Party Quantum Protocols Do Not Compose Securely Against Honest-But-Curious Adversaries
• Cryptographic Protocols under Quantum Attacks
• Composable Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model