Composable Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model

Abstract

We present a simplified framework for proving sequential composability in the quantum setting. In particular, we give a new, simulation-based, definition for security in the bounded-quantum-storage model, and show that this definition allows for sequential composition of protocols. Damgard et al. (FOCS '05, CRYPTO '07) showed how to securely implement bit commitment and oblivious transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where the adversary is only allowed to store a limited number of qubits. However, their security definitions did only apply to the standalone setting, and it was not clear if their protocols could be composed. Indeed, we first give a simple attack that shows that these protocols are not composable without a small refinement of the model. Finally, we prove the security of their randomized oblivious transfer protocol in our refined model. Secure implementations of oblivious transfer and bit commitment then follow easily by a (classical) reduction to randomized oblivious transfer.

21 pages

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