Quantum Cryptography: Security Criteria Reexamined

Abstract

We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root measurement is optimal for eavesdropping purposes, is not true in general. There are rather large parameter regimes in which the optimal measurement extracts substantially more information than the square-root measurement.

4 pages, 4 figures. No substantial changes. Updated version as published in PRA

References in corpus (7)

• Security of quantum key distribution using d-level systems
• Quantum State Discrimination
• Quantum cloning and the capacity of the Pauli channel
• Asymmetric quantum cloning machines in any dimension
• Quantum Key Distribution using Multilevel Encoding: Security Analysis
• Tomographic Quantum Cryptography
• Tomographic Quantum Cryptography: Equivalence of Quantum and Classical Key Distillation

Cited by in corpus (9)

• On mutually unbiased bases
• Quantum cloning
• Min-entropy and quantum key distribution: non-zero key rates for "small" numbers of signals
• Eavesdropping without quantum memory
• Iterative procedure for computing accessible information in quantum communication
• Robustness of a quantum key distribution with two and three mutually unbiased bases
• How well can you know the edge of a quantum pyramid?
• Variational Quantum Cloning: Improving Practicality for Quantum Cryptanalysis
• Coherent Eavesdropping Attacks in Quantum Cryptography: Nonequivalence of Quantum and Classical Key Distillation