Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
arXiv:quant-ph/0212066
Abstract
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
22 pages. (v3): Minor changes. (v2): Extensively revised and expanded. New results include a security proof for generic small flaws in the source and the detector
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