Practical Quantum Cryptography: A Comprehensive Analysis (Part One)

Abstract

We perform a comprehensive analysis of practical quantum cryptography (QC) systems implemented in actual physical environments via either free-space or fiber-optic cable quantum channels for ground-ground, ground-satellite, air-satellite and satellite-satellite links. (1) We obtain universal expressions for the effective secrecy capacity and rate for QC systems taking into account three important attacks on individual quantum bits, including explicit closed-form expressions for the requisite amount of privacy amplification. Our analysis also includes the explicit calculation in detail of the total cost in bits of continuous authentication, thereby obtaining new results for actual ciphers of finite length. (2) We perform for the first time a detailed, explicit analysis of all systems losses due to propagation, errors, noise, etc. as appropriate to both optical fiber cable- and satellite communications-based implementations of QC. (3) We calculate for the first time all system load costs associated to classical communication and computational constraints that are ancillary to, but essential for carrying out, the pure QC protocol itself. (4) We introduce an extended family of generalizations of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) QC protocol that equally provide unconditional secrecy but allow for the possibility of optimizing throughput rates against specific cryptanalytic attacks. (5) We obtain universal predictions for maximal rates that can be achieved with practical system designs under realistic environmental conditions. (6) We propose a specific QC system design that includes the use of a novel method of high-speed photon detection that may be able to achieve very high throughput rates for actual implementations in realistic environments.

In the earlier versions of this paper it was asserted without proof that the attacks considered in our analysis, namely, USD, PNS, and combined (hybrid PNS and USD), exhaust all possible individual attacks. This assertion is not correct and is modified in this revision: see the "Added Note" placed at the end of the paper immediately following the "Discussion" section for a fuller discussion. Our comparative analysis of USD, PNS and hybrid attacks is unaffected by this

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• A comprehensive design and performance analysis of LEO satellite quantum communication
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• Experimental quantum key distribution with simulated ground-to-satellite photon losses and processing limitations
• Advances in Quantum Radar and Quantum LiDAR
• Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication
• Laser annealing heals radiation damage in avalanche photodiodes
• Introduction to quantum radar
• Feasibility of the interlock protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks on quantum cryptography
• Vulnerability of "A novel protocol-authentication algorithm ruling out a man-in-the-middle attack in Quantum Cryptography"
• On Classical and Quantum Cryptography
• On the Optimal Mean Photon Number for Quantum Cryptography
• Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
• Privacy Amplification in Quantum Key Distribution: Pointwise Bound versus Average Bound
• An Attack to Quantum Cryptography from Space
• Simple Error Scattering Model for improved Information Reconciliation