Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

Abstract

This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) the key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.

RevTeX4, 11 pages, 15 figures

References in corpus (4)

• Cryptanalysis of dynamic look-up table based chaotic cryptosystems
• Cryptanalyzing a discrete-time chaos synchronization secure communication system
• Breaking a secure communication scheme based on the phase synchronization of chaotic systems
• Cryptanalysis of a novel cryptosystem based on chaotic oscillators and feedback inversion

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Cryptographic requirements for chaotic secure communications
• Generalized synchronization of chaos for secure communication: remarkable stability to noise
• Using a reservoir computer to learn chaotic attractors, with applications to chaos synchronisation and cryptography
• Breaking a Chaotic Cryptographic Scheme Based on Composition Maps
• Return-Map Cryptanalysis Revisited