Breaking a Chaotic Cryptographic Scheme Based on Composition Maps

Abstract

Recently, a chaotic cryptographic scheme based on composition maps was proposed. This paper studies the security of the scheme and reports the following findings: 1) the scheme can be broken by a differential attack with $6+\lceil {\log }_L(MN)\rceil$ chosen-plaintext, where $MN$ is the size of plaintext and $L$ is the number of different elements in plain-text; 2) the scheme is not sensitive to the changes of plaintext; 3) the two composition maps do not work well as a secure and efficient random number source.

9 pages, 7 figures

References in corpus (9)

• On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
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• Return-Map Cryptanalysis Revisited
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Cited by in corpus (2)

• Cryptanalysis of a one round chaos-based Substitution Permutation Network
• Breaking a chaotic image encryption algorithm based on modulo addition and XOR operation