Matching games with partial information

Abstract

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

19 pages, 8 figs

References in corpus (4)

• The Web of Human Sexual Contacts
• Happier World with More Information
• Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers
• Sex-Oriented stable matchings of the Marriage Problem with correlated and incomplete information

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• Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and Women
• Single parameter model of marriage divorce dynamics with countries classification