The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interactions

Abstract

We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system.

7 pages, 5 figures, minor modifications

References in corpus (3)

• Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipf's law
• Market Model with Heterogeneous Buyers
• Emergence of product differentiation from consumer heterogeneity and asymmetric information

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