Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies
arXiv:cond-mat/0005043 · doi:10.1088/0305-4470/33/43/101
Abstract
We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of the "temperature" controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement with numerical simulations.
Revtex file + 3 figures
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