The Evolution of Altruistic Rationality Provides a Solution to Social Dilemmas via Rational Reciprocity

Abstract

Decades of scientific inquiry have sought to understand how evolution fosters cooperation, a concept seemingly at odds with the belief that evolution should produce rational, self-interested individuals. Most previous work has focused on the evolution of cooperation among boundedly rational individuals whose decisions are governed by behavioral rules that do not need to be rational. Here, using an evolutionary model, we study how altruism can evolve in a community of rational agents and promote cooperation. We show that in both well-mixed and structured populations, a population of objectively rational agents is readily invaded by mutant individuals who make rational decisions but evolve a distorted (i.e., subjective) perception of their payoffs. This promotes behavioral diversity and gives rise to the evolution of rational, other-regarding agents who naturally solve all the known strategic problems of two-person, two-strategy games by perceiving their games as pure coordination games.

25 pages, 5 figures

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