Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
arXiv:2402.06298 · doi:10.1007/s10479-023-05340-3
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262-271, 1982) and Colomer-Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.
This article was published on April 15, 2023 in Open Access in the journal Annals of Operations Research