Demystifying DeFi MEV Activities in Flashbots Bundle
arXiv:2312.01091 · doi:10.1145/3576915.3616590
Abstract
Decentralized Finance, mushrooming in permissionless blockchains, has attracted a recent surge in popularity. Due to the transparency of permissionless blockchains, opportunistic traders can compete to earn revenue by extracting Miner Extractable Value (MEV), which undermines both the consensus security and efficiency of blockchain systems. The Flashbots bundle mechanism further aggravates the MEV competition because it empowers opportunistic traders with the capability of designing more sophisticated MEV extraction. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on DeFi MEV activities in Flashbots bundle by developing ActLifter, a novel automated tool for accurately identifying DeFi actions in transactions of each bundle, and ActCluster, a new approach that leverages iterative clustering to facilitate us to discover known/unknown DeFi MEV activities. Extensive experimental results show that ActLifter can achieve nearly 100% precision and recall in DeFi action identification, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art techniques. Moreover, with the help of ActCluster, we obtain many new observations and discover 17 new kinds of DeFi MEV activities, which occur in 53.12% of bundles but have not been reported in existing studies
arXiv commentThis submission serves as our full paper version with the appendix
References in corpus (14)
- SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols
- Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security
- Multiscale Granger causality
- SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance
- Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain
- Quantitative Impact Evaluation of an Abstraction Layer for Data Stream Processing Systems
- Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory
- SigRec: Automatic Recovery of Function Signatures in Smart Contracts
- DeFiRanger: Detecting Price Manipulation Attacks on DeFi Applications
- A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
- Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value
- ÐArcher: Detecting On-Chain-Off-Chain Synchronization Bugs in Decentralized Applications
- SoK: MEV Countermeasures: Theory and Practice
- An Empirical Study on Ethereum Private Transactions and the Security Implications
Cited by in corpus (5)
- Nurgle: Exacerbating Resource Consumption in Blockchain State Storage via MPT Manipulation
- Maximal Extractable Value in Decentralized Finance: Taxonomy, Detection, and Mitigation
- Analyzing Reward Dynamics and Decentralization in Ethereum 2.0: An Advanced Data Engineering Workflow and Comprehensive Datasets for Proof-of-Stake Incentives
- Smart Contract Fuzzing Towards Profitable Vulnerabilities
- Unpacking Maximum Extractable Value on Polygon: A Study on Atomic Arbitrage